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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL FEES INCURRED IN CONTESTING GIFT TAX DEFICIENCY-Petitioner gave shares of stock
in a closely held family corporation to his wife and children. After paying the
federal gift tax, he was notified by the Commissioner of a deficiency of $145,276.
The case was eventually settled by payment of $15,612. In this controversy
petitioner incurred legal expenses which he sought to deduct on his income tax
return under section 23(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. When his claim
was disallowed by the Commissioner, this suit was brought for refund. Held,
on certiorari, this expenditure was not "for the production or collection of in•
come'' nor incurred in the "management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income," and hence was not deductible. Lykes
17. United States, (U.S. 1952) 72 S.Ct. 585.
The Internal Revenue Code provides no specific authorization for deduction
of legal expenses; therefore, to be deductible such expenses must be brought
within some more general provision of section 23. In this case petitioner claimed
deduction was authorized under section 23(a)(2),1 the "nontrade or nonbusiness" deduction clause. Prior to 1942 as a result both of statutory inadequacy
and a narrow construction of section 23(a)(l)2 by the courts,3 those engaged
in activities which could not be classified as "trade or business" were not permitted to deduct expenses incurred in production of taxable income. Section
23(a)(2) was passed4 to remedy this defect. 5 The principal case is the third

1 Section 23(a)(2) provides for deduction from gross income of "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection
of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income." 56 Stat. L. 819 (1942), 26 U.S.C. (1946) §23(a)(2).
2 Section 23(a)(l) provides for the deduction of "All the ordinary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." 26 U.S.C. (1942)
§23(a)(l).
3 See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 61 S.Ct. 475 (1941) (expenses incurred by an individual taxpayer in looking after his income-producing securities held not
expenses incurred in trade or business); City Bank v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121, 61 S.Ct.
89 (1941) (testamentary trustee held not engaged in trade or business when managing
investments); Pyne v. United States, 313 U.S. 127, 61 S.Ct. 893 (1941) (similar activity
by an executor held not a business).
4 Revenue Act of 1942, §121, 56 Stat. L. 798 at 819; I.R.C., §23(a)(2).
5 "The bill corrects this inequity by allowing all of the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred for the production or collection of income or for the management,
conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income. Thus, whether
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Supreme Court decision interpreting the scope of deductions permitted under
this section.6 Bingham's Trust 11. Commissioner7 gave the section a broad construction, holding that income tax litigation expenses paid by a trustee and
expenses incident to a distribution of trust assets at the termination of a trust
were deductible as expenses incurred as a proximate result of the management
of property held for the production of income.8 Two later circuit court decisions9
allowed deductions for income tax expenses simply on the authority of this
case without demanding any substantial showing that these expenses were a
"proximate result" of management of income producing property. The result
was an amendment of the Regulations permitting a deduction of all expenses
incurred by a taxpayer in the determination of income tax liability. 10 In the
principal case the district court felt that an extension of the principle of the
Bingham case to cover expenses incurred in gift tax litigation was justified,
commenting that it would be extremely unfair if the Commissioner had the
power to levy an excessive deficiency assessment and then force the taxpayer to
defend it at his own personal expense. 11 Petitioner's principal argument was that
he would have to sell income producing properties to meet the deficiency judgment should he be forced to pay it; therefore, expenses incurred in resisting the
deficiency were expenses incurred in the "conservation" of income producing
property. This argument had already been rejected in Cobb v. Commissioner,12
but the district court chose not to follow this decision. The Supreme Court
accepted the reasoning of the Cobb case13 and pointed out that should petitioner's argument be accepted it would mean that expenses incurred in defending
a negligence action would be deductible if there were a possibility that the

or not the expense is in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, if it is expended
in the pursuit of income or in connection with property held for the production of income,
it is allowable." H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 46 (1942).
6 The other two were McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 65 S.Ct. 96 (1944)
(campaign expenses incurred by a judge in seeking re-election held not deductible); Bing•
ham's Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945), discussed infra. See
also Brodsky and McKibbin, "Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses," 2 TAX
L. REv. 39; Nahstoll, "Non-Trade and Non-Business Expense Deductions: Section 23(a)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code," 46 MxcH. L. R.Ev. 1015 (1948).
7 Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner, supra note 6.
8 "The requirement of Sec. 23(a)(2) that deductible expenses must be 'ordinary and
necessary' implies they must be reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and
proximate relation to the management of property held for the production of income."
Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 370.
9 Williams v. McGowan, (2d Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 570; Stoddard v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 445, overruling the court's earlier decision in Stoddard v.
Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 76.
10 T.D. 5513, 1946-11, INT. R.Ev. BUL., p. 3, amending Treas. Reg. Ill, §29.23(a)I5.
11 Lykes v. United States, (D.C. Fla. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 537. The court also felt it
strange that under Treasury regulations a taxpayer could not deduct expenses in determining gift tax liability, but could deduct legal fees incurred in determining that gift tax
expenses were not deductible.
12 (6th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 711, cert. den. 338 U.S. 832, 70 S.Ct. 79 (1949).
13 Principal case at 589.
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taxpayer would have to dispose of income producing property to meet the
judgment. The court seems correct in ruling that section 23(a)(2) was not
intended to produce such a result. In the Bingham case, contesting the income
tax deficiency was an integral part of the management of the property held for
the production of income. In the principal case the expenses involved were
attributable to the making of a gift and, in the words of the circuit court, the
effect "upon . . . income producing property was at best indirect, remote and
hypothetical.''14 The distinction seems to lie in the closeness of the relationship
between the expense involved and the management of the income producing
property. The result reached by the court seems to be in harmony with the
purpose of the statutory provision and serves as an aid in marking the limits of
the applicability of the Bingham decision.
Richard B. Barnett, S. Ed.

14

Lykes v. United States, (5th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 964 at 967.

